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A
mAbstract
This paper examines how left-behind children influence migration duration in
China. We first present a simple illustrative model that incorporates economic and
non-economic motives to migration duration. Using individual data from a survey
carried out in Wuwei county (Anhui province) in 2008, we find that migrant parents
of children in primary school tend to delay their return, a result we interpret as
illustrating the need for migrant parents to accumulate money for their offspring’s
education. In contrast, parental time appears substitutable by coresiding grandparents
who contribute to delay the parents’ return, especially mothers, when they have
children below the age of 12.
JEL classification: J61, J13, C41, O53
Keywords: Return migration; Left-behind children; Discrete-time duration analysis;
China1. Introduction
Economic development is often combined with the transfer of a large proportion of
workers from the rural-based traditional agricultural sector to the urban industrial sec-
tor. China has been witnessing such a massive internal labour transfer since the mid-
80s. The latest official figures from the Sixth National Population Census released in
April 2011 estimate the total number of rural migrant workers to be 153 million in
20101. Such large-scale internal migration results from a series of institutional and
structural changes along with rapid industrialisation. Before the reforms started in
1978, labour mobility was strictly controlled. Since then, the government policy has
loosened, moving from permitting rural labour mobility, to guiding rural labour mobil-
ity and then encouraging rural labour mobility. Thanks to the relaxation of various
regulations, people are, in principle, free to move to places they want and to live and
work in cities as long as they want (Fan et al., 2011).
However, while labour mobility in China has dramatically increased over time, tempor-
ary migration dominates population movements that are shaped by the strong institu-
tional constraints imposed by the household registration system (Hukou). Formally
established in 1958, this system requires every Chinese citizen to be registered according
to her place of permanent residence and occupation (agricultural versus non-
agricultural)2. It confers different legal rights to residents. In villages, residents are given
rights to land for farming and housing, while in cities residents are given access to urban2015 Démurger and Xu; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
ttribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any
edium, provided the original work is properly credited.
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partially reformed, access to public services remains deeply tied to the household registra-
tion place, to the disadvantage of migrants. This is notably the case for children’s educa-
tion. Because the education budget for the nine-year compulsory education in China is
allocated through local governments and is not transferable, urban schools with a limited
education budget are reluctant to accept rural migrant children unless their parents com-
pensate for the additional cost. Hence, although rural migrant children are not officially
denied access to the urban public school system, parents are requested to pay “education
endorsement fees” (jiaoyu zanzhu fei) for children attending school in places other than
their place of household registration, and the amount of such fees can be prohibitive for
poor migrant families (Lai and Chen, 2010). At the non-compulsory senior high school
level, additional registration place-based constraints also apply because the education
policy requires students to take the university/college entrance examination in their hukou
registration area3. A direct consequence of such administrative and financial barriers
is that migrant’s children are often left behind in rural home regions as long as they
are enrolled in the education system and are looked after either by one parent or by
grandparents or relatives.
Because increasingly more people are involved in internal migration, the number of
“left-behind” children (liushou ertong) is also increasing dramatically. According to data
from the Sixth National Population Census, there were a total of 61 million left-behind
children in rural China in 2010, of which approximately 43 million were below the age
of 14 (UNICEF, 2014). Together with another 35.8 million living with their migrant
parents in cities, the two groups account for 38% of all children in China. Compared
with 2000, the number of rural left-behind children in 2010 is triple (UNICEF, 2014).
Data gathered as part of the Rural–Urban Migration in China and Indonesia (RUMiCI)
project confirm that many migrant children grow up away from their parents: in 2007,
approximately 60% of the migrant children aged 16 and below were left behind in the
rural hometown (Gong et al., 2008).
As argued by Rossi (2008), leaving children behind is a source of a potentially high
“social cost of migration”, although migration may also confer benefits to the left-
behind family through remittances that ease budget constraints and thereby increase
health and education opportunities4. Migration can affect children in various dimen-
sions. Children who grow up either with a single parent or with grandparents or rela-
tives may suffer from a lack of parental care that adversely affects their educational
outcomes (Giannelli and Mangiavacchi, 2010; McKenzie and Rapoport, 2011). More-
over, the break-up of the family unit can create material and psychological insecurity
that affects the well-being of children left behind. For China, there is small body of
literature that examines the well-being of left-behind children by focusing on different
facets of living arrangement outcomes, such as school performance and health condi-
tion. Mixed results have been found regarding the effect of migration on children’s
school performance. In their early study based on survey data from 36 primary schools
in Shaanxi province in 2006, Chen et al. (2009) do not find evidence of any negative
impact of migration on school performance. In contrast, a number of more recent
papers offer evidence of a net negative impact of parental migration on education out-
comes of children who are left behind. For instance, studies that use data from the
China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS) show that migrant children are worse off
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parents do not migrate (Lee, 2011; Lu, 2012). The lag in educational progress of the
children who stay behind in rural areas is corroborated by Meyerhoefer and Chen
(2011) on data from the 1995 China Living Standards Survey (CLSS) in 2 north eastern
provinces (Hebei and Liaoning). Drawing on data collected in 2000 in 6 provinces
representative of China, Wang (2014) also confirms the detrimental impact of parental
migration on children’s school enrolment and finds that the negative effect is larger for
boys than for girls. The adverse effect of parental migration is found to start early in
the educational process for boys and to persist over time, whereas for girls, it is signifi-
cant at the secondary school level only. A negative impact of parental migration is also
found on children’s school performance and cognitive development (Zhang et al., 2014;
Zhao et al., 2014; Zhou et al., 2014). Zhang et al. (2014) study grade 3 to grade 5 pupils
in a county of Hunan province and find significant negative impacts of being left-
behind by both parents on children’s cognitive development (measured by Chinese and
mathematics test scores), whereas the impact of being left-behind by one parent is in-
significant. Similar findings are reported by Zhou et al. (2014) on data from children
staying behind in Anhui and Jiangxi provinces. Finally, drawing on survey data on grade
4 and grade 5 pupils collected in 2009 in Ningxia and Qinghai, Zhao et al. (2014) find
that the negative impact of having a migrant parent on a child’s math score is larger
with a migrant mother than with a migrant father.
With respect to health outcomes, Gao et al. (2010) find that parental migration is a
risky factor for unhealthy behaviours amongst adolescent school children in rural
China. In a recent study using the CHNS panel data from 1997 to 2006, Mu and de
Brauw (2015) offer evidence that parental migration has no significant impact on the
height of young children (aged under 5 in the initial years of the panel) but that it
improves their weight. Finally, Kong and Meng (2010) find that children of migrants
(either left behind or in cities) are less likely to have good education and health out-
comes compared with rural non-migrant children and urban children.
Because family ties in Chinese society remain very strong, there are good reasons to
expect that concerns about the welfare of left-behind family members may affect migra-
tion (and return) decisions. Accounting for the social cost motive of leaving behind
children in determining the length of rural–urban migration in China is important not
only from an academic perspective but also in terms of policy implications. The grow-
ing tension over the “migrant labour shortage” that has appeared in China’s coastal
cities, where booming small and private enterprises have absorbed a large quantity of
migrants from western China, is illustrative of the importance of family factors in
migration decisions. Moreover, as mentioned above, the hukou system is considered an
important cause of the transient nature of migration. Evaluating the role of children in
individual’s decisions regarding migration duration can thus help to further understand
the multidimensional impact of the hukou system on migration.
The overall goal of this paper is to explore the role of children as a motive for return
migration in China. We first present a simple illustrative model of migration duration
based on Dustmann (2003) that accounts for left-behind children through parents’
altruistic behaviour. The discussion also points to the potential differentiated impact of
children on return decisions depending on their age and gender. Then, using a unique
dataset collected in 2008, we provide an empirical test based on a duration model. We
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incomplete migration spells and return migrants with complete migration spells.
Our paper contributes to the existing literature in at least two directions. First, although
children may be important stakeholders in the migration phenomenon, little attention has
been given to children in the analysis of migration decisions in the international migration
literature. A few exceptions are Djajic (2008) and Dustmann (2003). In the Chinese
context, the dearth of data is an important limit to the study of the interaction between
left-behind children and migration duration. To our knowledge, Connelly et al. (2012) is
the only work that thoroughly studies the role of children in the migration decisions of
Chinese women using data collected in the early 2000s. Complementary to their study, we
propose an updated and more comprehensive evaluation of how left-behind children
affect the return decision. In particular, we use a recent database that covers a period
during which both rural–urban migration and a counter-flow of population back to the
countryside increased dramatically, which may enable us to better capture recent changes
associated with return migration in China. Based on these data, our analysis also adds to
the work of Connelly et al. (2012) by examining the whole migrant population (rather
than only women at the age of childbearing) and by analysing both complete and incom-
plete episodes of migration for the entire individual migration history.
Second, by examining the determinants of the length of migration, this paper also
contributes to filling the lack of research on migration duration in China. Although the
length of migration is an important indicator of the flow and scale of migration as well
as the economic effects on both receiving and sending regions, it has received rather
limited attention in the migration literature, including for international migration5. For
China, the issue has strong political importance because there is a fear that the inability
of cities to adequately absorb rural migrants may eventually lead to social unrest.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the study area and provides
descriptive statistics on migration duration. Section 3 presents a simple illustrative
model. The empirical methodology is described in Section 4, and the determinants of
migration duration are discussed in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.2. Study area and data description
The data used in this paper come from a series of rural household interviews conducted
in Wuwei county, Anhui province, from September to November 2008. Wuwei county
was selected because of its relatively long labour force export history, the county being
famous for sending out female domestic service workers since the beginning of the 1980s.
According to local official statistics, individuals working outside the county accounted for
43 per cent of the entire county’s rural labour force at the end of 2006 (Wuwei County
Government, 2007). Together with the large-scale migration, the county is also charac-
terised by a sizable number of left-behind children6. Recent data show that in the district
of Wuhu, to which Wuwei county belongs, 83,400 of the total 332,000 compulsory educa-
tion students are left-behind children, accounting for 25% of the entire student popula-
tion7. In another county of the province, Lujiang county, a comprehensive survey
conducted in 2005 and 2006 for 12 middle schools in 9 towns showed that up to 60% of
the student population were left-behind children with one or both parents being migrants
the year before the survey (Xu et al., 2007).
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administrative villages in each town and twenty households on average in each village
were randomly selected. A total of 239 households were interviewed, providing informa-
tion on 969 individuals. Individual information includes personal characteristics, current
working position and income. For those having a migration and/or return migration
history, their working experience during and after migration was also recorded. A separate
administrative village survey was also conducted in each village to collect information
about the general economic, geographic and demographic conditions at the locality.
The sample used in this paper is composed of 284 individuals having a migration
and/or return migration history, with 125 return migrants and 159 on-going migrants.
Return migrants are individuals who are currently residing and working in the county
with at least 6 months migration work experience outside the county. These individuals
declared having no plan to migrate again. On-going migrants are individuals who are
either in cities at the time of the survey8 or temporarily returned with a plan to migrate
again soon (they are circular migrants). This dataset is unique in that it contains
detailed information both on the complete length of migration for each return migrant
and the incomplete length of migration for on-going migrants. For return migrants, the
length of migration duration is defined as the total cumulated number of years of
migration from the year of an individual’s first migration up to the year of her last
return. For on-going migrants, the length of migration duration is the total cumulated
number of years of migration from the year of an individual’s first migration until the
year of the survey.
Information gathered during the survey provides hints on the importance of the left-
behind children phenomenon in the area and on its possible relation with return
decisions. Most school-age children (76.4%) are found to be living in the local town or
village, and only 2.5% are living with their migrant parents in cities. A small portion (16%)
is living alone in other places outside the county: this is mostly the case for students of
above high school level who pursue studies in other regions. Although our data did not
directly record the situation for pre-school children (under the age of 6), pre-school
children are facing a similar situation of separation from their parents. The survey
collected information on the reasons for return migration, with multiple answers allowed.
Of all the reasons provided, 25% were related to children, either to “look after children” or
“for children’s education”9.
Table 1 reports summary statistics of migration spells. The mean length of migration
for the overall sample is 6.74 years, and 31% of migrants have experienced more than 8
years of migration10. The mean lengths of stay for both on-going and return migrants
are fairly close, though slightly longer for the former (6.88 years vs. 6.57 years). The
pairwise correlation of the length of migration with the year of migration is negative
and significant for both return migrants and on-going migrants: earlier migrants are
more likely to have a longer migration duration than more recent migrants11.
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the overall sample as well as for return
migrants and for on-going migrants. The average age of migrants (both return and on-
going) is 34 years and the average education level is 6.8 years. Of the sample, 42% of
migrants are female, 72% are married with an average migrant household size of 4.7, and
53% have a migrant spouse (either return or on-going). In terms of family composition12,
half the migrants have children under the age of 16, 14% have children aged between 12
Table 1 Migration spells statistics
Average migration
spell
0-1 year 1-3 years 3-5 years 5-8 years >8 years Sample
size
Percentage
On-going migrants 6.88 13% 20% 19% 18% 31% 159
(5.59)
Return migrants 6.57 15% 26% 15% 12% 32% 125
(5.43)
All 6.74 14% 22% 17% 15% 31% 284
(5.51)
Sample size 284 40 63 49 43 89
Source: Wuwei 2008 Survey.
Notes: Standard deviation in parenthesis.
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(under the age of 6).
The sub-sample of return migrants is significantly much older (11 years difference),
less educated, more likely to be married, and less likely to have household members
aged between 55 and 70 at home than the out-migrant population. Interestingly, for
their first migration, return migrants migrated on average at an older age than on-goingTable 2 Descriptive statistics
Mean value or % Return migrants On-going migrants Mean test Full sample
Age (years) 40.20 29.65 *** 34.29
Age at first migration (years) 26.37 22.29 *** 24.08
Female 0.416 0.415 NS 0.415
Married 0.888 0.591 *** 0.722
Education (years) 5.888 7.434 *** 6.754
Household size 4.256 5.006 *** 4.676
Migrant spouse 0.600 0.465 ** 0.525
At least a member above 70 0.176 0.170 NS 0.173
At least a member aged 55 to 70 0.376 0.560 *** 0.479
Children-related variables
At least one child (<16) 0.472 0.522 NS 0.500
At least one child (12–15) 0.184 0.101 ** 0.137
Son (12–15) 0.120 0.050 ** 0.081
Daughter (12–15) 0.088 0.057 NS 0.070
At least one child (6–11) 0.176 0.264 ** 0.225
Son (6–11) 0.080 0.201 *** 0.148
Daughter (6–11) 0.120 0.113 NS 0.116
At least one child (<6) 0.216 0.321 ** 0.275
Son (<6) 0.120 0.151 NS 0.137
Daughter (<6) 0.112 0.170 * 0.144
Sample size 125 159 284
Source: Wuwei 2008 Survey.
Notes: For return migrants, all children-related variables are computed at the moment of return; for on-going migrants,
they are computed at the time of the survey. The mean test column indicates the significance level of mean
differences between return migrants and on-going migrants. NS non-significant; *significant at 10%; **significant
at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
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tendency of the younger generation to move to cities at a younger age compared with
early migrants. In regard to children-related variables, there are interesting gender differ-
ences too. Return migrants are significantly less likely to have a son in primary school at
the moment of return than on-going migrants at the time of the survey, but this is not the
case for daughters. By contrast, they are more likely to have a son aged 12 to 15 (in junior
secondary school) at the moment of return than on-going migrants at the time of the sur-
vey, and again, there is no significant difference for daughters.3. An illustrative model of return decisions with left-behind children
Return migration can be considered part of a lifetime utility maximisation plan with a
given budget (and liquidity) constraints (Borjas and Bratsberg, 1996). In the inter-
national migration literature, the return motives notably include location preferences
with a higher marginal utility of consumption in the area of origin (Djajic and
Milbourne, 1988), a higher purchasing power of the destination area currency at home
(Djajic, 1989; Stark et al., 1997), and higher returns to human capital accumulated in
the destination area at home (Dustmann, 2001; Dustmann et al., 2011). However, as
highlighted by Dustmann (2003) and Djajic (2008), the decision to return and the opti-
mal time of return can also be influenced by altruistic motives of parents towards their
offspring in the household. Hence, the migration behaviour, and the decision to return,
may be driven not only by individual life-cycle considerations but also by dynastic
motives such as offspring’s welfare in the future13. Emphasising the family unit rather
than the individual migrant makes sense in rural China, where family ties are strong
and may be important components in explaining individual decisions. Moreover, such
an approach seems the most relevant in a context where migration patterns are shaped
by the household registration system (hukou), which does not entitle rural migrants to
urban benefits and leaves most children behind. In their study of a sample of migrants
living in Beijing, Fan et al. (2011) argue that the desire to be near left-behind children
is an important reason for a migrant’s return.
The simple model presented below is meant to be illustrative of the conjectured
influence of left-behind children on return migration. It builds on Dustmann (2003)
and includes a number of alterations to account for specific Chinese features. First, we
assume that the parent migrates alone and leaves behind her child. Second, because we
are interested in school-aged or pre-school children in the home village, we also
assume that the child does not work in the second period. Given these two assump-
tions, the proposed model captures the situation of a family unit composed of a worker
engaged in migration (the parent migrant) and a left-behind child.
We consider two periods. In period 1, the parent works and lives in a city, while her
child lives in the countryside and is subsidised by the parent. In period 2, the parent
may decide to return or to stay in the city. The parent decides her own and her child’s
consumption in periods 1 and 2. Because the child is not assumed to work in period 2,
the altruism of the parent takes place through income transfer to the child in period 1
and through daily care (in case of return) or income transfer (in case of settlement in
city) in period 2. As in Dustmann (2003), the return decision is taken by simply com-
paring lifetime welfare in the two locations.
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Period 1’s utility function U1 is given by:
U1 c1; k1
  ¼ 1n c1 þ γ1n k1 ; ð1Þ
where c1 is the consumption of the migrant parent, k1 is the consumption of the left-
behind child, and the parameter γ > 0 is the altruism weight.
Period 2’s utility function U2j depends on the location choice of the migrant, whether
settled in the city (j =M) or returned home (j = R), and is given by:
U2j c2j; k2j
  ¼ 1n c2jaj þ γ1n k2jbj ; ð2Þ
where aj and bj are preference parameters. In particular, aR > aM and bR > bM reflect a
location preference of the migrant for her home village in terms of both her own con-
sumption (a) and her offspring’s consumption (b).
Under the simplifying assumption of no discounting, the total utility function U of
the parent can be simply expressed as follows:
U ¼ 1n c1 þ γ1n k1 þ 1−hð Þ 1n c2MaM þ γ1n k2MbM  þ h 1n c2RaR þ γ1n k2RbR  ;
ð3Þ
where the parameter h stands for the return decision. At h = 1, the migrant decides to
return; at h = 0, she settles in the city.
The budget constraint of the parent equalises intertemporal income and
consumption:
c1 þ 1−hð Þc2M þ hc2R þ k1 þ 1−hð Þk2M þ hk2R ¼ y1 þ 1−hð Þy2M þ hy2R; ð4Þ
where y1, y2M, and y2R are the income of the parent in period 1, period 2 in the city,
and period 2 at home, respectively.
The return decision of the migrant is given by the maximisation of her utility U with
respect to her own consumption in periods 1 and 2 as well as to her left-behind child’s
consumption in periods 1 and 2 under the budget constraint expressed above for two
scenarios: settling in the city (h = 0) or returning to the countryside (h = 1). The inter-
temporal utility maximisation leads to the following results. The migrant parent will
choose to return if:
2 1þ γð Þ1n y
1 þ y2R
y1 þ y2M
 
þ 1n a
R
aM
 
þ γ1n b
R
bM
 
> 0: ð5Þ
As in Dustmann (2003), the first term illustrates the income impact of return on total
utility: as earnings can be assumed to be lower at home (y2R < y2M), the decision to re-
turn will entail a loss in utility. The loss in utility is higher for altruistic parents (γ > 0)
because their reduced earnings also affect the child’s outcomes. This may be the case,
for instance, if the reduced earnings contribute to reduce opportunities for education
or health care. This first term captures a standard money income effect. Moreover, if
the migrant has no location preference (aR = aM and bR = bM), her altruistic behaviour
would reinforce the standard income effect towards a decision not to return. The
second term shows the influence of the relative location preference of the migrant in
terms of her own consumption. If aR > aM, her relative preference for her home village
may partly compensate the income effect and logically reduce migration duration. The
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child is perceived as suffering from parental absence in her daily life, then bR > bM will give
an incentive to the parent to return. This third term captures a time of the parent effect.
Assuming no migrant parent location preference in her own consumption (aR = aM), the
decision to return for an altruistic parent simply reduces to a comparison of the loss in
utility due to lower income (and, possibly, a reduction in education opportunities)
with the gain in utility thanks to a better-off child (through better quality day-to-day
care, for instance).
In the vein of Dustmann (2003), this model illustrates the major trade-off a migrant
parent faces when deciding to stay or to return: the consumption of the child is multi-
dimensional and the various channels related to money and to parental time may work
in opposite directions regarding the decision to return. In addition, the magnitude of
each effect may vary with the age of the child: day-to-day care may be particularly
valued for young children, while educational opportunities become important when the
child is of school age. In a society with a strong tradition of preference for sons13, one
may further expect that the return-decision outcome is also linked to the gender of the
child, although the total child effect may remain ambiguous. Finally, in the Chinese
context, an additional feature to consider is the high prevalence of multigenerational
coresidence in rural areas and the potentially major role of coresident grandparents in
their grandchildren’s lives (Zeng and Xie, 2014). Analysing rural data from the China
Household Income Project (CHIP) survey 2002, Zeng and Xie (2014) show for instance
that the effect of coresident grandparents’ education on grandchildren’s educational
attainment is as large as that of parental education (while this is not the case for non-
coresident grandparents). From a survey on migrants living in Beijing, Fan et al. (2011)
find evidence that migrants with fewer parents in the home village are more likely to
bring their children with them, and they argue that migrants prefer to leave their
school-age children behind for easier access to education in the home village when
their own parents are available to help. Hence, the presence of coresiding grandparents
may attenuate the parental time effect through a (parents-to-grandparents) substitution
effect for day-to-day care, and again, the magnitude of the effect may vary with the age
of the child, and possibly with the gender of the migrant parent.
In summary, the return decision (h) of a migrant will depend on the expected income
gap between the city and the hometown, the migrant’s preferences and altruism, her
children’s characteristics (notably gender and age), and the availability of some parental
substitutes (e.g., grandparents). The empirical analysis presented below aims to estimate
this reduced-form relationship by focusing on the migrants’ length of stay in cities.4. Empirical approach
Framework for duration analysis
As indicated above, our dataset contains a sample including both on-going out-
migrants and return migrants, which allows us to analyse complete and incomplete
length of migration. Migration duration data are right-censored by definition because
the date of transition out of the state (i.e., returning home) is unknown for on-going
migrants. As highlighted by Jenkins (2008), survival (or duration) analysis offers a num-
ber of advantages compared with OLS or binary choice models for such data. In
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turn migration), for censoring in the data, and for incorporating time-varying variables
in the estimation.
Because answers about migration duration were given in months, discrete time periods
for migration duration are defined in months15. Consequently, we use a discrete-time
(grouped data) version of the commonly used proportional hazard (PH) model16 devel-
oped by Prentice and Gloeckler (1978). Let Ti be the discrete random variable represent-
ing the uncensored time at which the end of migration occurs. Then, for individual i who
stayed in the city for at least t months, the discrete-time hazard rate λi (t,X) conditional
on covariates can be defined as follows:
λi t;Xð Þ ¼ Pr Ti ¼ t=Ti≥t;Xit½  ð6Þ
This equation gives the conditional probability of individual i’s migration ending at
time t, given that it has not ended yet. We consider a complementary log-log specifica-
tion for the hazard function, which gives:
λi t;Xð Þ ¼ 1− exp − exp β0Xi tð Þ þ γ tð Þð Þ½  ð7Þ
As shown by Prentice and Gloeckler (1978), this model is a discrete-time analogue tothe continuous-time Cox proportional hazard model. γ(t), which depends on t alone, is
a transformation of the baseline hazard common to all individuals. We assume a dur-
ation dependence pattern analogous to that in the continuous-time Weibull model17 by
entering the log of t as a covariate. exp(β’ Xi(t)) is a person-specific non-negative func-
tion of covariate X, which scales the baseline hazard function common to all persons.
An important issue in duration models is unobserved heterogeneity. Ignoring unob-
served heterogeneity that arises when unobserved factors influence duration can lead
to a severe bias in the estimates of the covariate effects (Lancaster, 1990). Conse-
quently, one could obtain an underestimate of the true proportionate response of the
hazard if the unobserved heterogeneity is not captured because of potential omitted
variables or measurement errors (Jenkins, 2008). We account for unobserved hetero-
geneity by incorporating a Gamma distributed random variable with unit mean and fi-
nite variance, as suggested by Meyer (1990).
The covariates that enter the vector X include individual characteristics, such as
age18, gender, education and marriage, and individual migration experience measured
by an occupational dummy variable that equals one if the migrant is a wage-worker
during the last/current job in the city and zero otherwise. Destination and hometown
characteristics are also measured, respectively, by the size of the destination city and
the logarithm of the town’s average rural per capita annual net income between 2004
and 2008. We also control for household characteristics that may influence the decision
to return. Four variables are considered: the household size, the migration status of the
spouse, and two dummy variables for having a household member aged, respectively,
between 55 and 70, and above 70. We distinguish these two age groups for the elderly
in order to get a clearer view of the effect of grandparents. As mentioned above, grand-
parents in Chinese society play a potentially prominent role in their grandchildren’s
care. In the meantime, elders also count as dependents who need to be taken care of.
As a tradition in Chinese society, supporting old parents is an important responsibility
for children when they grow up. If this is the case, then having elderly at home may
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migrants in our sample is 34 years old, the age of their parents can confidently be
assumed to be around their late 50s or early 60s, and the elderly aged above 70 are
more likely to be the great grandparents of the migrant children.
Finally, to assess how the presence of children by age and by gender affects the
parent’s length of stay in the city, we use a set of children-related variables for each in-
dividual at the time of return measured by dummy variables. We define children as
family members who are below the age of 16. We then further distinguish children
from different age-groups (children between 12 and 15, children between 6 and 11, and
pre-school children) and by gender.Endogeneity concerns
One difficulty in investigating the role of children in the return migration decision is
that there are potential identification concerns. First, migration plans and fertility may
be simultaneous decisions. Second, unobserved factors that are related to fertility may
simultaneously affect return plans. Unfortunately, our cross-section database does not
allow us to adequately address the potential endogeneity bias from a statistical point of
view. However, we argue that in the case of China, there are good reasons to believe
that the implied bias should not be too strong because the fertility decision is not fully
private and free as it is in other countries. That said, we also acknowledge that we can-
not fully rule out potential identification issues and that the implied biases should be
kept in mind when interpreting the coefficients.
China provides an interesting case regarding fertility that is both controlled and low.
The one-child policy introduced in 1979 to control population growth, which was
deemed to be a serious threat to economic development, resulted in a significant
change in the family structure through its strong impact on the timing of first birth
and on the likelihood of higher-order births. Restrictions on family size and on the tim-
ing of marriage and child bearing that were imposed under the policy led to a sharp de-
crease in the total fertility rate from 2.8 in 1979 to 1.8 in 2001 (Festini and de Martino,
2004). As documented in McElroy and Yang (2000), although the policy is more liberal
in rural than urban areas, a second child, at most, can be approved by local authorities
while a third child remains prohibited (for Han people).
The local enforcement of the one-child policy in Wuwei county can be seen from
data on the number of children per household. In our sample (including both migrant
and non-migrant households), the average size of the household is 4.07. On average,
households have 0.64 children below the age of 16; 51% have no child below 16; 35%
have 1 child; 13% have 2 children; and 1% have 3 children. The proportions are similar
when the sample is restricted to women aged between 20 and 50. Moreover, a compari-
son between non-migrants and migrants (either returned or on-going) does not reveal
any significant difference in the number of children between the two groups, which in-
dicates no strong relationship between migration and fertility behaviour, at least in the
area under study.
In addition to the low level of fertility, another feature worth emphasising here is that
the one-child policy entails controls that make the fertility decision not free at the indi-
vidual or family level, even for the timing of the first birth. Michelson's (2010)
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performance of local cadres is evaluated to an important measure by their success in
meeting birth targets. To keep local fertility levels within these fixed targets, couples
wishing to have a child are required to apply for a birth permit. Birth permits are issued
only to applicants who satisfy policy conditions—if the local birth quota for the year
has not been reached. In other words, every birth is supposed to be authorised, or on
the plan” (p. 192). Local family planning authorities are responsible for the enforcement
of the policy in the form of punishments and fines for couples who do not comply with
the family planning. Evidence has also been reported of more draconian measures being
employed, such as forced abortion or sterilisation by the local family planning author-
ities (Hardee-Cleaveland and Banister, 1988).5. Migrants’ length of stay in cities: a duration analysis
Figure 1 depicts non-parametric Kaplan-Meier estimates of the survival function. It
clearly highlights negative duration dependence: the probability that migration ends
shortly increases with the length of migration. The hazards are high at the beginning of
a spell and then decline monotonically. The median survival rate (i.e., stay in cities) is
approximately 132 to 144 months (11–12 years). When the migration spell reaches
more than 252 months (i.e., approximately 21 years), the overall survival rate finally
stabilises at a low level of approximately 12%19, suggesting that 12% of the migrant
population tends to settle permanently in cities.
Table 3 reports estimation results for the discrete-time proportional hazard model
with various sets of covariates. Model 1 is the baseline model where a dummy for
having at least one child under the age of 16 in the household is introduced. Model 2
includes a set of control variables by age groups: children under the age of 6, children
aged between 6 and 11, and children aged between 12 and 15. Model 2b adds the effect
of coresiding grandparents on migration duration by children’s age. Model 3 further
distinguishes the gender of children for the three age-groups. The last two columns
provide separate estimates for men and for women using the specification of Model 3.
As explained in the methodological section, it is very plausible that there are unob-
served individual characteristics, such as motivation or ability, which affect the lengthFigure 1 Kaplan-Meier survival estimate.
Table 3 Hazard model estimates of migration duration
Model 1 Model 2 Model 2b Model 3 Men Women
Baseline hazard (log spell month identifier) 0.569** 0.684*** 0.638*** 0.549** 0.344*** 0.522***
(0.017) (0.004) (0.009) (0.032) (0.009) (0.003)
Age at first migration (years) 0.0512** 0.0643*** 0.0588*** 0.0531** 0.0408** 0.0208
(0.016) (0.004) (0.008) (0.030) (0.020) (0.326)
Female 0.982*** 1.125*** 1.133*** 1.036***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002)
Education (years) 0.0398 0.0501 0.0406 0.0354 −0.00538 0.0489
(0.356) (0.284) (0.364) (0.426) (0.907) (0.443)
Married 1.223** 1.345** 1.221** 1.081* 0.376 2.081***
(0.037) (0.019) (0.024) (0.073) (0.400) (0.002)
Occupation before return (wage worker = 1) 0.0906 0.106 0.146 0.0257 −0.239 0.691
(0.762) (0.744) (0.667) (0.930) (0.421) (0.140)
Working area before return (big city = 1) 0.0365 0.0416 0.00725 0.00404 −0.128 −0.131
(0.886) (0.879) (0.977) (0.987) (0.626) (0.690)
Log average rural per capita annual net
income (2004–2008)
1.389** 1.359* 1.841*** 1.277** 1.055 1.410
(0.030) (0.052) (0.006) (0.043) (0.118) (0.109)
Migrant spouse −0.786* −1.028** −0.833* −0.805 −0.497* −0.967*
(0.088) (0.036) (0.072) (0.117) (0.084) (0.053)
Household size −0.112 −0.0766 0.105 −0.0486 −0.0914 0.0937
(0.242) (0.483) (0.349) (0.636) (0.436) (0.562)
At least a member above 70 −0.260 −0.288 −0.582* −0.278 −0.317 −0.106
(0.426) (0.418) (0.095) (0.392) (0.422) (0.809)
At least a member aged 55 to 70 −0.397 −0.573* −0.557** −0.276 −1.244***
(0.150) (0.060) (0.041) (0.369) (0.003)
At least one child (<16) −0.736**
(0.021)
At least one child (12–15) −0.390 −0.632
(0.292) (0.113)
At least one child (6–11) −1.048*** −0.173
(0.007) (0.630)
At least one child (<6) −0.164 0.283
(0.631) (0.475)
Member aged 55-70* child (12–15) 0.216
(0.748)
Member aged 55-70* child (6–11) −3.610***
(0.002)
Member aged 55-70* child (<6) −1.223**
(0.023)
At least a son (12–15) −0.294 −0.115 0.0677
(0.474) (0.775) (0.914)
At least a daughter (12–15) −0.524 −0.498 0.354
(0.275) (0.253) (0.670)
At least a son (6–11) −1.196*** −1.460*** −0.237
(0.006) (0.008) (0.662)
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At least a daughter (6–11) −0.369 0.00847 −0.813
(0.411) (0.982) (0.190)
At least a son (<6) 0.0476 0.176 −0.195
(0.900) (0.668) (0.757)
At least a daughter (<6) −0.200 −0.187 −0.500
(0.587) (0.640) (0.439)
Constant −19.93*** −20.57*** −25.18*** −19.13*** −15.38*** −20.16***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.007) (0.005)
Variance of gamma 0.608 0.845 0.615 0.476
LR test of variance of gamma = 0 1.239 2.681 1.975 0.515
p-value 0.133 0.051 0.080 0.236
Number of person-month observations 22,986 22,986 22,986 22,986 16,154 6,832
Log likelihood −740.3 −738.0 −726.2 −736.5 −444.7 −283.6
Source: Wuwei 2008 Survey.
Notes: See Table 2. p-values in parentheses. *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. The coefficients are estimated using the
complementary log-log model with Gamma-distributed unobserved heterogeneity for columns 1 to 4 and with no
unobserved heterogeneity for columns 5 and 6. The coefficient on the duration dependence variable is the log
of time.
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log model that does not take into account any unobserved individual heterogeneity
(see Additional file 1: Table A1) and a complementary log-log model that assumes a
Gamma distribution for an included individual heterogeneity term (Table 3). The LR
test of the model with versus without unobserved heterogeneity reported at the bottom
of Table 3 shows that the null hypothesis that the variance of the unobserved hetero-
geneity parameter is equal to zero is rejected for Models 1, 2, and 2b (but not for
Model 3), which implies that the model with Gamma-unobserved heterogeneity fits
the data best for these models. Still, one can note that the corresponding estimations
without controlling for unobserved heterogeneity presented in Additional file 1: Table
A1 in the Appendix show fairly robust results. In all the models, the coefficients and
their level of significance are broadly similar. The coefficients are slightly larger in ab-
solute value when controlling for unobserved heterogeneity, which is consistent with
the fact that failing to account for unobserved individual heterogeneity underestimates
the extent to which the hazard rate increases with duration and the magnitude of the
impact of the covariates on the hazard rate (Lancaster, 1990).
The various models displayed in Table 3 highlight a number of interesting patterns
about the influence of left-behind children on parental migration duration. First, the effect
of having children under 16 is negative and significant (Model 1): at each survival time,
migrants with children have a 48% lower probability of returning (i.e., exhibit longer
migration spells) than migrants with no child20. Model 2 shows that the negative impact
found in Model 1 is attributable to children aged 6 to 11 (i.e., children in primary school),
whereas the effect of pre-school children (under the age of 6) and children in secondary
school (aged between 12 and 15) is negligible. Consistent with our expectation, having
coresiding grandparents aged between 55 and 70 attenuates the parental time effect for
children both under the age of 6 and between 6 and 11, as indicated in Model 2b. Interest-
ingly, the effect seems stronger for children in primary school. The coefficient for having
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effect related motive for the migrant to stay longer in the city dominates only when there
is a rather young grandparent (aged between 55 and 70) at home.
Model 3 further distinguishes children of different age groups by gender and shows that
the gender of the offspring also matters. Interestingly, the negative impact of children
aged 6 to 11 can be specifically attributed to sons (and not significantly to daughters).
Model 3 shows that having a son in primary school decreases the probability of return by
30%. To investigate gender differences in return behaviour, separate estimations for men
and for women are also reported in the last two columns of Table 3. Interestingly, they in-
dicate that the son-in-primary-school effect is prominent for migrant fathers and non-
significant for migrant mothers. In contrast, the impact of having grandparents at home
(members between 55 and 70) only matters for women’s return, indicating that grandpar-
ents are potentially good substitutes for mothers in the household for child care.
The main results regarding the impact of left-behind children on migration duration
can be summarised as follows. First, individual migration duration is driven by family
motives, with left-behind children–in particular children in primary school–being
significant determinants of the migrants’ decision to extend their length of stay in
cities. Second, coresiding grandparents offer substitutes that allow for delayed return of
migrant parents, particularly for those having young children (below the age of 12).
Third, the gender of the left-behind child matters for the migration spell, with sons
generating a significant impact compared to daughters. Fourth, there are also gender-
based differences regarding the migrant parent: sons in primary school are a strong
motivation for a longer length of stay of their migrant father, whereas grandparents
appear as potential substitutes for mothers in taking care of left-behind children.
Going back to the illustrative model presented in Section 3, these findings highlight
a number of potentially important channels in migrants’ decision to stay longer in cit-
ies or to return. First, there is evidence that children at different ages matter differently
in the decision-making of migrant parents. Second, the financial accumulation motive
is a strong determinant of longer stay in cities for migrant parents having school-age
children. At the same time, coresiding grandparents may attenuate the parental time
effect, notably for migrant mothers, for both pre-school children and children in elem-
entary school. Finally, some evidence of gender differences is found, which may be
interpreted as illustrative of the traditional “son preference” values in rural China.
Fathers tend to stay longer in cities if they have a son in primary school, but not if they
have a daughter in primary school: we may conjecture that this difference reflects a
stronger weight put on accumulating financial savings in order to keep their son at
school (and to afford paying school fees at the secondary and post-secondary levels) in
the foreseen future21.
In addition to children-related variables, we find consistent results regarding other
explanatory variables in all the models. Unsurprisingly, the baseline hazard increases with
elapsed survival time, which means that return probabilities depend positively on the
length of migration spells to date. The increasing baseline can be interpreted as an
illustration of the temporary nature of the migration phenomenon in China. To further
illustrate this point, Figure 2 displays the predicted hazard rate at the mean of covariates
based on the estimation of Model 122. It shows that the predicted hazard rate is increasing
all along the migration duration.
Figure 2 Predicted discrete hazard rates.
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impact on the hazard rate: favourable economic conditions contribute to attracting
migrants back home. In other words, the migration duration is longer for migrants
from poorer regions than for migrants from wealthier emigration regions23.
Turning to individual characteristics, we find a positive impact of age on the hazard
of return. People who migrated at an older age are more likely to have higher hazard
rates of return. Gender also influences the length of migration, with female migrants
being significantly more likely to have shorter lengths of stay than male migrants. Com-
pared with single individuals, married individuals are also more likely to return quickly.
Regarding the migration status of the spouse, migrants with a migrant spouse exhibit
lower hazard rates, which means that they are less likely to return sooner than migrants
who have a non-migrant spouse. This finding is consistent with Connelly et al. (2012),
who find that for women, having a husband who has migrated increases the length of
the last completed migration episode by eight months. One should note that the migra-
tion status of the spouse is likely to be endogenous because migration and the length of
stay in city are household-level decisions. Hence, unobserved factors that are related to
the spouse’s decision to migrate may at the same time influence the migrants’ return
plans. However, the limitation of our cross-section dataset does not allow us to
adequately instrument this variable. As a simple sensitivity check, Additional file 1:
Table A1 displays estimates of Model 3 without the migration status of the spouse
(Model 3b) and confirms the stability of our estimates. Finally, the effect of having
elderly above the age of 70 in the household is negligible. As these elderly may be great
grandparents in our sample, these findings may suggest that older (possibly great)
grandparents are usually not the direct dependents of their grandchildren (the migrant
parents here) and that they are not responsible for taking care of their great
grandchildren.6. Conclusion
This paper contributes to the understanding of migration dynamics within China by
exploring the determinants of the spell of rural-to-urban migration and by highlighting
the cost of leaving behind children. A simple model based on Dustmann (2003) is
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the prospects of their offspring and to discuss the potential differentiated impact by
age and gender.
Our empirical test confirms the role that left-behind children play in influencing
migration duration in China. In particular, we find that having children of school-age is
a motivation for migrant parents to extend their length of stay in the city, a result we
interpret as illustrating the need for migrant parents to accumulate money for their off-
spring’s education. In contrast, parental time appears substitutable by coresiding grand-
parents who contribute to delay the parents’ return, especially mothers, when they have
pre-school children or children in primary school. Regarding gender differences, our
findings confirm a pro-son bias: compared to daughters, migrant parents respond more
closely to the relative importance of the sons’ needs at school age.
As discussed in the introduction, one of the key issues regarding migration duration
in China lies in the prevailing non-voluntary separation of migrants and their left-
behind children as a social consequence of the restrictions imposed by the hukou
system and education policies. In particular, leaving behind school-age children in order
to accumulate finance for children’s education seems a priority family solution for
migrants’ family. But children undoubtedly also need physical and mental care from
their parents. Therefore, a direct implication of our findings is that including migrant
children in the local urban education system and allowing them to take higher educa-
tion entrance exams in the places where they have attended schools would certainly
contribute to opening choices for migrants to settle in cities. This would not necessarily
entail a full reform of the hukou system but rather access to public services no longer
being tied to the place of household registration.
By emphasising the importance of family demand factors in return migration, our
findings also emphasise the multidimensional nature of migration. The simple “success”
(NELM) or “failure” (Lewis, 1954; Todaro, 1969) dichotomy and the “double selection”
theory (Borjas and Bratsberg, 1996) on return migration may not properly capture all
the dimensions at stake in out-migration and return migration. In the case of China,
where particular institutions impose strong constraints on individual or family choice,
our findings point to the importance of accounting for both economic and non-
economic determinants of migration duration to analyse the dynamics of migration. As
such, they contribute to the literature on migration by stressing the importance of
using a family unit framework in modelling return migration decision mechanisms.
Moreover, because internal migration is the main engine of urbanisation in China, un-
derstanding the factors that explain variations in migration duration is important for
designing optimal migration and urban development policies.7. Endnotes
1In Chinese statistics, migrant workers are persons working and living outside the
town of their household registration for a period over six months. See Chan (2012).
2See Chan and Buckingham (2008) for a detailed description of the household regis-
tration system, both historically and in light of the recent waves of reform.
3The examination system is not uniform across China, and its implementation varies
greatly at the provincial level. In 1987, the Shanghai municipality pioneered in
Démurger and Xu IZA Journal of Migration  (2015) 4:10 Page 18 of 21designing its own university entrance examination. Since then, 16 provinces have set
up an independent decision system. Recently, the trend has been reversed, and it has
been officially announced that 25 provinces and municipalities will adopt a unified
national examination in 2016.
4See Antman (2013) for a survey of the growing empirical literature on the impact of
migration on families left behind.
5One may yet refer to Carrión-Flores (2006), Djajic (2008), Dustmann and Kirchkamp
(2002), Dustmann (2003), Kirdar (2013), Lindstrom (1996), Schroll (2009) and Stark
et al. (1997).
6Wuwei county is not a special case within the province. In Connelly et al. (2012),
among respondents of a survey of rural women of childbearing age from Anhui and
Sichuan provinces collected in the fall of 2000, only 12% took their child with them
during their last migration episode. Clearly, a large number of children are being raised
in rural areas by grandparents and relatives while their parents work in cities. An inves-
tigation conducted by the County Women’s Federation in Hedian town (one of the 23
towns of the county) showed that 65% of the students at school in the town are left-
behind children. Among them, 77% have both parents away. In 43% of the cases,
grandparents are taking care of the left-behind child, and in the other 57%, relatives or
friends are taking care of the left-behind child. The frequency of the parents’ visits are
once a year for 58% of the cases, once every two years for 27%, and less than once every
two years for 15%.
7http://ah.anhuinews.com/system/2012/03/02/004806735.shtml (In Chinese).
8Either the main respondent (usually the household head or the spouse) or another
family member was asked to answer individual questions for the absent on-going
migrant member.
9In some instances, parents even reported returning “for the sake of children’s educa-
tion because of the hukou”.
10This average duration of migration is consistent with the findings of larger urban-
based migrant surveys, including the 2007 RUMiCI survey, which reports an average
duration of 7 to 8 years for on-going migrants. See Gong et al. (2008) for a comparison
of all survey data available for China.
11The correlation coefficients are −0.65 for the whole population, −0.95 for out-
migrants, and −0.52 for return migrants. All the correlations are statistically significant
at 1 per cent.
12All children-related variables are computed at the moment of return for return
migrants and at the time of the survey (2008) for on-going migrants.
13Considering the household, rather than the individual, as the most appropriate
decision-making unit in return migration is consistent with the “New Economics of
Labor Migration” (NELM) literature, which explicitly integrates migration decisions
into a household strategy (Taylor, 1999).
14See, e.g., Lee (2008) for a review of the long history of pro-son bias in China.
15When the duration time is discrete, the estimation function is slightly different. A
detailed description can be found in Jenkins (2008).
16The general idea of a proportional hazard model is that the effect of an independent
variable is seen as having a constant proportional effect on the baseline hazard. The
adoption of such a model is usually grounded on two important specifications: the
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served heterogeneity (Bhat, 1996).
17The most commonly used form in continuous-time duration studies is a parametric
hazard (Bhat, 1996) with an assumed Weibull form baseline (Meyer, 1990).
18The age variable is recomputed to reflect the age at the moment of migration.
19However, one should note that for this long duration, the 95% confidence interval
gives a range between 5% and 23%. This might be related to the fact that we do not
have many individuals with such a long migration history.
20This is calculated from the exponentiated coefficient (not reported here), which
gives the hazard ratios as in a continuous time model.
21As rightly pointed out by the referee, it is interesting to note that the educational
investment in sons translates into the fathers being away a good deal of the time while
they are children, and this may be an issue later for boys not having their fathers
around. In the end, the son preference may somehow backfire.
22The predicted hazard rate is calculated based on the mean level of the predicted
hazard rate for each person given the values of her covariates and the spell month value
(Jenkins, 2008).
23This finding is consistent with the international migration duration literature,
particularly with the empirical findings of Schroll (2009) in the case of Denmark.
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